We are living in a remarkable time in humanhistory. Throughout the world we see nations striving together to further the cause of peace for a variety of reasons, the most recent of which is a growing concern about humanitarian conditions. As the noted historian, John Keegan, states in his book A History of Warfare, Theeffort at peace-making is motivated not by calculation of political interest but by repulsion from the spectacle of what war does.
Nowhere is this humanitarian movement more evident than in the recent example of the International Treaty to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines [officially Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction]. As the result of a widespread reaction to the indiscriminant use of anti-personnel landmines and the ensuing civilian casualties, it is easy to understand the motivation behind this effort. With support around the world, this treaty attempts to ban a specific weapon type from the battlefield.
We all recognize that this is an admirable goal, but all of us here today also understand the very realappeal of mines. They are cheap and they are effective. It is cheaper to build a mine than it is to build a countermeasure and faster to build a new mine than a new countermeasure. The miner seems to have the advantage in staying ahead in this loop. These qualities ensure that we will continue to see them on the battlefields of the future.

This prediction becomes most evident when we acknowledge that emerging nations view mines as a practical means to counter the United States technological advantage and resulting military superiority. Most of our potential adversaries are constantly searching around the margins of our capabilities for areas that will provide them an asymmetrical benefit. Mines provide them this form of leverage. The political restraints we face against using mines do not necessarily apply to enemy governments, further increasing this advantage. The bottom line is that it is likely that the entire world's best intentions will not remove the mine threat any time soon.

Because of this reality, we must be prepared to conduct mine warfare any time and anywhere we deploy forces. As we plan for this eventuality, we must keep our goal in mind: a mine countermeasure capability that supports a maneuver-style construct of warfare. We do not want to mass forces any longer or in any greater strength than is absolutely necessary. We want to create multiple paths of operations. We want to execute faster than the enemy can react; getting inside his decision making cycle and thus negating his bility to counter our forces.

We recognize that our goal is a multi-layered challenge and that Marine forces are only one piece of the overall puzzle. However, we are a critical piece, and we do have some peculiar needs. For example, our mission is power projection from the sea. The capacity of the Advance Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and the LCAC for long-range, high-speed, maneuver from the sea fully supports this mission. If we're to fully realize this capability, we have to be able to address explosive and non-explosive obstacles in deep water, shallow water, very shallow water, the surf zone and across the beach and inland to the objective. The Navy challenge stops at the beach, whereas the beach is where the Army challenge starts. We, on the other hand, cover all maneuver regimes. (Note that this is true with AAAV, because an over the horizon penetration capability, for which we're paying about five million dollars a copy, will likely start in deep water (greater than 200 feet)).

We need to pay particular attention to the challenges faced by our naval forces. Encompassing the entire breadth of mine warfare, these challenges range from operational concerns down to more tactical problems.

Before we address these challenges, we must first recognize that, while we may not have reached our desired goals for naval mine warfare, we have in fact made tremendous progress since Desert Storm. We have a dedicated Mine Countermeasures Force composed of 26 mine countermeasures ships, two squadrons of MH-53 mine countermeasures helicopters, various mine countermeasures EOD detachments and the USS Inchon as a dedicated command and control platform for MCM operations. These assets signify a renewed commitment to Naval Mine Warfare that represents a fiscally realistic effort during a decade of decreasing defense budgets.

While we have made progress, if we examine our capabilities from an operational perspective, we find that we still have some problems. The first concern is that we lack a sensing capability that helps us to determine the level of mine threat in various areas at the operational level of war. Without this capability, we lack necessary information to make decisions about where to penetrate the enemy's littoral in the first place. Our current capabilities are more tactical in nature, requiring our forces to conduct what can be thought of as probing attacks to find weaknesses.

Once we move ashore, this problem continues. Landmine sophistication continues to rise, necessitating a technological increase in our detection and clearing methods. We have moved from looking for metallic objects to searching for changes in density between the soil and mines or using ground penetrating radar. Yet, in many cases we are still using man-portable systems that have a limited width of scan and little to no standoff capability. We are still faced with a trial and error type mine detection capability that does not allow for operational level decision making regarding force movement. Instead, we send our forces out and if they run into a mine problem, we then go into a frenzy of decision-making to overcome the situation. Under this construct, the option of avoidance rarely enters the picture.

Another concern is that we need a command and control system that connects Marine forces with Navy Mine Countermeasures forces in a real-time, shared awareness mode. When faced with a significant mine threat, this capability would help with obstacle avoidance, should available information change after the amphibious force has begun movement to the objective.

At the tactical level, we need an in-stride neutralization capability designed to enable maneuver-style combat operations. We want to avoid attrition-style mine breaching and clearing. It is too slow and it increases our exposure to enemy action. Modern weapons are deadly and can be brought to bear at long range upon a force that halts or slows to neutralize obstacles.

For example, when faced with a mine threat at sea, our operating forces must pause while supporting naval mine countermeasures forces are brought forward. Once these arrive, mine countermeasures operations begin, increasing in scale and scope as more supporting forces arrive. The time delay that this imposes is unfortunate. A key element in timely minefield clearance is the actual presence of mine clearing assets in the area of operations. The Navy is forward basing some MCM assets to likely crisis areas and the helicopter and MCM detachments are on constant standby for short notice deployment. Even with these efforts, we understand that there will still be some delays, most of which actually enter into the operational level. In the future, we want our forward-deployed naval forces to be able to begin mine countermeasures operations immediately, admittedly at a lower level of effort, while supporting mine countermeasures forces begin their movement to the crisis area. This in-stride capability is critical to negating the asymmetric advantage of mines. We are committed to bringing into being mine countermeasures capabilities that are assigned (or organic) to the deployed Amphibious Ready Groups and Carrier Battle Groups.

At the tactical level, we find that this in-stride neutralization capability effectively does not exist. We are very concerned about our ability to counter the mine threat in Very Shallow Water. The assets we have in place today have fair capabilities for actions in deep water all to way to the 40 foot line. When we go above this line and onto the beach, we find that our capabilities are not much further along then they were fifty years ago. The very real possibility exists for the same level of carnage to be present in tomorrow's battles, as there was in the opening scene of the movie, Saving Private Ryan, if we do not solve this problem. Some complicating factors are the ease with which mined areas can be re-seeded using remote delivery systems and the likelihood of exposure to enemy threat systems for personnel attempting to clear this zone. We are committed to finding solutions to this weakness in our capabilities. An example of the extent of our commitment is the fact that nearly three fourths of the Office of Naval Research's Science and Technology activity is currently dedicated to the Very Shallow Water, surf zone and beach problem. It is only through this type of dedicated effort that we will move forward to cover the entire spectrum of ship-to-objective maneuver.

As we move closer to realizing our future warfighting concept of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), we must maintain our dedication and commitment to finding solutions to the Very Shallow Water mine problem. The very heart of amphibious operations is to have our forces cross this border between sea and land. While OMFTS calls for a minimal presence in the beach area, the need for a seamless transition across this sea-land interface remains a requirement. Our goal is an in-stride breaching capability that will allow rapid penetration into inland areas, while protecting the breaching force from enemy attack and preventing delays at the surf zone. I ask for your help in maintaining our momentum on this critical issue.

On land, our in-stride capabilities are not much better at the tactical level. Our current vehicle-mounted systems either plow through minefields or attempt to blast them into submission. Neither of these methods is particularly fast. Both expose Marines to enemy action. The recently cancelled Grizzly program was intended to address this challenge. Although that program was cancelled, the requirement still remains and so we now have the Armored Breaching Vehicle program in its place. If Congress provides appropriate funding, it promises to deliver a more capable vehicle at less cost and still essentially remain on the same time schedule for delivery as the Grizzly. Unfortunately, both of these systems are heavy, tracked vehicles and they both use the same brute force and ignorance type methods for handling mines. In this day and age, we should be able to do better.

The opportunity to address some of these concerns is before us. Today, there are de-mining operations occurring all over the globe. These present a valuable testing ground for technological improvements in mine location and clearing. They also present a vast potential market for business leaders looking for expansion possibilities, perhaps in conjunction with interested private or public organizations to help defray costs and solidify the market. There may be some concern that military and civil requirements for mine countermeasures equipment are different, making capitalizing on this market very difficult. I disagree. Both potential customers require systems that provide rapid, remote, wide area detection and mapping (or marking). The difference is how these groups would then use the information, with military users choosing areas to breach or how best to avoid the minefield, and civilian users clearing the mines as part of a de-mining operation. I offer this to you as a challenge because opportunity is knocking, and the world is waiting for someone to step up and open the door.

Finally, I would like to leave you with some thoughts about one of my greatest concerns: the complacency that may be developing regarding mine warfare. In some circles, there is a feeling that we are not making enough progress in naval mine warfare. This feeling, if it persists, could lead to a feeling of apathy towards this vital mission. In response, I will emphatically state that the Marine Corps and, if I might speak for the CNO, the Navy as well, are dedicated to improving our naval Mine Countermeasures capabilities. We feel that our plan to do so is viable and realistic and that we have made great progress. This momentum will continue.

Regarding land mines, I see this complacency perhaps beginning to grow. It is probably the result of two causes. The first is our Gulf War success, which was more a function of the Iraqi inability to maintain their minefields and cover them with fire, as well as their basic ineptitude, than it was a testament to our mine clearing expertise. The second is more vague in that it is perhaps a slight dropping of our packs because of the worldwide movement to ban antipersonnel land mines. As Americans, we have a tendency to believe in the most noble qualities of the human race and perhaps in this case we may be wishing for the best possible outcome.

The reality is that mine warfare will be with us for the foreseeable future. We must continue to be prepared for this mission, both at sea and on land. We must maintain our current momentum in solving the problems that remain in both areas and if possible increase this momentum further. Finally, we should increase our educational and awareness efforts, such as this great conference, so that current and future generations of military and political leaders understand the complexity and importance of the issue and devote the appropriate resources to research, acquisition and training.